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Blameworthiness, Desert, and Luck
Mitchell N. Berman*
Draft, September 26, 2021
Abstract: Philosophers disagree about whether outcome luck can
affect an agent’s “moral responsibility.”
Focusing on
responsibility’s “negative side,” some maintain, and others deny,
that an action’s results bear constitutively on how “blameworthy”
the actor is, and on how much blame or punishment they
“deserve.” Crucially, both sides to the debate assume that an
actor’s blameworthiness and negative desert are equally affected—
or unaffected—by an action’s results. This article challenges that
previously overlooked assumption, arguing that blameworthiness
and desert are distinct moral notions that serve distinct normative
functions: blameworthiness serves a liability function (removing a
bar to otherwise impermissible treatments), whereas desert serves
a favoring function (contributing new value to states of affairs, or
providing new reasons for responsive treatments). Having
distinguished (negative) desert from blameworthiness, the article
proposes a novel resolution to the outcome-luck debate: that
results do not affect an agent’s liability to blame, but do affect the
amount and severity of blame to which the agent is justly liable,
including by affecting the severity of blame that the agent
deserves.

Introduction
A standard case in the moral luck literature takes the following form: H and
M, acting independently, both shoot at V, intending to kill, without
justification or excuse, and (if it matters) while holding equal credences
regarding the likelihood of succeeding. Due to factors outside of the control
or anticipation of H or M (a gust of wind, an imperfection in M’s rifle barrel,
V’s sudden movement), H’s bullet hits V, killing them, while M’s bullet flies
harmlessly past. (H hit V; M missed V.)
Philosophers use hypotheticals like this one—or others that involve
paired agents who act recklessly or negligently with respect to the result at

issue, rather than intentionally 1 —to motivate questions about moral
outcome luck that they frequently formulate (when not deploying that
frustratingly plastic word “responsibility”) in terms of “blameworthiness”
or “desert.” They ask, for example, whether H and M are “equally
blameworthy,” 2 or whether H and M “deserve equal punishment.” 3
Frequently, commentators speak both ways at once. To pick a single
example almost at random, Susan Wolf, in a well-known article (2001, 5-6,
emphases added), characterizes the outcome luck question,
interchangeably, as “whether those whose acts actually lead to serious harm
deserve the same treatment . . . as those who, but for fortune, would have
caused as much damage” and as whether “a person whose actions have
morally worse effects is . . . more blameworthy than one whose equally faulty
behavior has less harmful consequences.” Similarly, the most prominent
living retributivist, Michael Moore (1997, 215, 218) poses the “question” and
“problem” of “moral luck” in terms, interchangeably, of
“blameworthiness,” “moral deserts,” and “moral responsibility.”
The assumption that underlies this pattern of speech, occasionally made
explicit, 4 is that to be blameworthy for thus-and-such and to deserve
punishment (or suffering, or hard treatment) for thus-and-such are linked
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1 I highlight cases in which the results are intended because, like others (Sverdlik
1988, 79), I find them simpler. But, in broad strokes, my analysis applies the same to cases
of intent, knowledge, foresight, and negligence. The analyses might differ at the level of
detail, and I identify some possible differences in due course.
2 Examples of formulations along these lines include, among countless others, Edwards
& Simester (2019, 65); Nelkin (2019); Hartman (2019, 3181), Otsuka (2009, 373); Enoch &
Marmor (2008, 409); Domsky (2004, 445); Zimmerman (2002, 561); Sverdlik (1988, 79).
3 Again, just a sample of numerous instances are Freiman & Nichols (2011, 124); Levy
(2005, 265-66); Christopher (2004, 421); Rosebury (1995, 499); Lewis (1989, 55-56).
4 For example, Andrew Khoury (2018, 781) squarely maintains that the puzzle of
resultant moral luck involves the extent of an agent’s blameworthiness or praiseworthiness
and then reasons: “It is natural to think, from the retributivist standpoint, that just
punishment is a matter of giving the criminal what he deserves and that what he deserves is
proportionate to his blameworthiness. If the successful are more blameworthy than the
unsuccessful, then they deserve harsher punishment.”
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in such a fashion that questions formulated in terms of blameworthiness
and deserved punishment necessarily elicit the same answers. Those who
believe in outcome luck will conclude that H is more blameworthy than M
and deserves more punishment or harsher treatment; those who reject
outcome luck will conclude that H and M are equally blameworthy and
deserve equal punishment. I will call the premise that the factors that
determine the fact and extent of an agent’s blameworthiness are identical to
those that determine the fact and extent of an agent’s negative desert the
equivalence thesis, shorthand for “the blameworthiness-desert equivalence
thesis.”5 The equivalence thesis is nearly universal. Not only is it shared by
proponents and opponents of moral outcome luck, 6 it is endorsed or
assumed by scholars writing on topics across the waterfront of punishment
theory. But if the equivalence thesis is false, then these two questions about
moral outcome luck—phrased in terms of “blameworthiness” and of
“desert”—are not alternative formulations of the same substantive
question, but different substantive questions that can (though might not)
support different answers.
I argue in this paper that the equivalence thesis is false. I’d like to
further conclude that one of these normative concepts is sensitive to the
results of an agent’s willings and that the other is not. That would furnish
a neat and crisp resolution to the outcome-luck debates. Unfortunately,
matters prove to be more complex and equivocal. They are equivocal
because whether negative desert is sensitive to outcomes depends upon an
account of the point of or rationale for (negative) desert in the first place, an
issue that this article hopes to advance but does not purport to resolve. They
are complex because, just as negative desert must be distinguished from
blameworthiness, a second largely overlooked distinction must be drawn
internal to blameworthiness, the distinction between the extent to which an
agent is liable to blame for their conduct, and the magnitude or severity of
blame to which they are liable.
People who harbor this assumption are overwhelmingly likely to believe that
equivalence holds as well between praiseworthiness and deserved reward. But to simplify
discussion, and because it is the clear focal case in the literature, I will concentrate on the
“negative” side—the side that involves blameworthiness and deserved punishment—not the
“positive” side that involves praiseworthiness and deserved reward. Readers who deny that
anybody ever deserves bads (to be punished, to suffer, etc.) but accept that persons can
deserve goods (to be rewarded, to be happy, etc.) can follow along by making the necessary
substitutions in what follows.
6 The only counterexamples I’m aware of are persons who combine belief in moral
outcome luck with the denial of desert, either negative or total. Acceptance of moral outcome
luck leads to the conclusion that H is more blameworthy than M. Denial of desert entails the
conclusion that H and M deserve the same punishment, namely none.
5
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The paper proceeds over five sections. Section 1 introduces two distinct
functions that responsibility concepts are needed to serve: liability and
favoring. Sections 2 and 3 argue, respectively, that desert is a favoring
concept, and that blameworthiness serves a liability function. Section 4
examines how the results of an agent’s conduct bear on their desert. It
explains that an answer to that question depends upon an answer to the
logically prior question of why the fact of wrongdoing, results aside, would
favor that the wrongdoer suffer or be punished or blamed in the first place.
That is, we cannot settle on confident judgments about the grounds or
determinants of deserved blame or suffering—and, in particular, whether
those grounds or determinants include results of an agent’s willings—
without a clearer grasp of what justifies our embrace of negative desert as a
moral concept that serves a favoring function. Developing and defending
an account of desert’s point or function is a large undertaking that cannot
be attempted here. But Section 4 presents the skeleton of one account
supportive of the conclusion that desert is sensitive to (some) results.
Section 5 examines how the results of an agent’s conduct bear on their
blameworthiness. It argues that results matter—there is outcome luck—in
regards to how much an agent is liable to blame, but not in regards to how
much blame an agent is liable to.

1. Two Responsibility Concepts: Liability and Favoring
Two distinct paths into our topic immediately suggest themselves. The
more obvious is to start with our concepts desert and blameworthiness,
aiming to show that, properly analyzed, they serve different normative
functions and rest on different sets of determinants. A second would start
by identifying the normative functions that we need our moral
responsibility concepts to serve, aiming to show that desert and
blameworthiness are best assigned different functions (where the relevant
criteria include fit with current usage and theoretical utility). If my
substantive claims about desert and blameworthiness are correct and not
highly revisionary then both routes—concepts first, or functions first—
should be available and each should have the capacity to deliver us to the
same place.
For two reasons, I will pursue the second approach. First, I’m betting
that more readers will assent more quickly to what I claim about the
functions that our responsibility concepts must serve than to my—or any—
proposed analyses of the concepts. In particular, the concepts-first
approach must wend its way through the fast-growing and markedly
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fragmented literature on blameworthiness that the functions-first approach
might render at least partially unnecessary.
Second, the functions-first approach more closely tracks the analytic
framework that Gideon Rosen (2015) pressed in the course of presenting
and defending his own analysis of blameworthiness (his “alethic
conception”). I find that framework incisive and congenial. But I also think
that its value is increased, not diminished, if we start, as Rosen himself does
not, by attending carefully to distinct functions that our responsibility talk
and practices serve. Proceeding functions-first allows me to make better
use of Rosen’s argument, both as guide and as foil.
***
“A theory of moral responsibility,” Rosen begins, “should address three
questions” (2015, 65):
The analytic question: What is it for a person to be morally
responsible for an act, event, or state?
The grounding question: What are the conditions [and determinants]
under which a person is morally responsible for an act, etc.?7
The explanatory question: Why are the conditions [and determinants]
of moral responsibility as they are?
In addressing the analytic question, Rosen observes: “the phrase ‘moral
responsibility’ has no clear sense—not in ordinary English, and not in
philosophy.” Therefore, he says (2015, 66), “before we can raise substantive
questions about the nature of his thing, we need to fix—by fiat—a definite
meaning for the phrase.”8
I find Rosen’s parsing of the separate questions extremely helpful. I too
will begin by addressing the analytic question and will turn later (sections
4 and 5) to the grounding and explanatory questions. But where Rosen
infers from the fact that “moral responsibility” bears multiple meanings that
we should stipulate a single answer to the analytic question, I propose to
investigate the variety of questions to which our responsibility talk is
I take the inserted bracketed language to be a friendly amendment. See Rosen (2015,
65 n.1).
8 Rosen’s own proposal, which will not further concern us, is as follows: (1) A person is
morally responsible if blameworthy or praiseworthy. (2) X is blameworthy for φ iff X merits
moral blame for φ; (3) X merits moral blame for φ if it would be appropriate to blame X for
φ; (4) It would be appropriate to blame X for φ iff the hostile reactive emotions toward X
would be appropriate.
According to Rosen’s proposed alethic conception, the
appropriateness of reactive emotions depends upon the truth of the belief-like thoughts
implicit in them.
7
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responsive. Proceeding in this way may yield a non-arbitrary, nonstipulative multiplicity of senses of moral responsibility to analyze.
The first thing to note, as others have emphasized (e.g., Zimmerman
2015; Moore 1997, 197), is that responsibility talk of the sort that the moral
luck discussion implicates arises in prototypically backward-looking
contexts. This is not true of all responsibility talk. Some responsibility
questions arise prospectively. We might say that only responsible agents
should be permitted to enter into binding contracts. Or we may ask about
the responsibilities that come with a particular role. But the natural contexts
for debates over outcome luck are retrospective.
Think of morality as a system designed, first and foremost, to establish
forward-looking norms regarding what we may, or must, do.9 At time tn it
addresses agent A, enjoining them not to φ. Suppose that A flouts that
injunction. What are the moral consequences, at tn+x, of A’s norm-violation?
How, if at all, has A’s (wrongful) φing altered the moral landscape, as far as
A is concerned? How, if at all, does A’s “moral profile” (Greenberg 2014,
1308) change in virtue of A’s φing?
Here are three possibilities. The first two are uncontroversial; the third
is disputed.
First, in virtue of A’s φing, A sometimes assumes or acquires new moral
obligations—what W.D. Ross (1930, 21) termed “duties of reparation” and
others call “residual duties.” 10 A must apologize to those they have
wronged, and try to repair any damage. Scholars have argued, for example,
that A must reorganize their life to minimize the risk of reoffending (Lee
2009), or must provide their victims with protection against wrongdoing by
others (Tadros 2011). Second, A sometimes becomes liable to treatments by
others that would be unfair to A, or would otherwise treat A wrongfully,
but for A’s φing. Third, in addition to making A liable to treatments to
which A had been immune, A’s φing could create new reasons for some
agent or class of agents to subject A to such treatments, or could alter the
non-instrumental impersonal value of states of affairs that involve A. It
could be, for example, that the state of affairs in which A experiences
suffering or anguish would have been bad absent A’s φing but now
becomes good. In sum, A’s wrongdoing can possibly ground at least three
different, but not incompatible, moral consequences: A’s φing grounds or
activates duties imposed on A; A’s φing grounds liability to treatment that,
The notion of “design” here is functional and evolutionary, not agentially directed.
Philosophers debate whether A’s φing grounds a new duty or activates the antecedent
of an existing conditional duty to which A was already subject. For my limited purposes, I
believe and hope that we needn’t choose between wide-scope and narrow-scope construals
of the relevant duties.
9

10
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otherwise, would be unfair to A or would wrong A; A’s φing grounds
reasons to treat A in ways that would not otherwise obtain.
Three points need be made about these three potential changes to A’s
moral profile triggered by A’s earlier conduct. First, none of the three
changes is a bare “assessment” or “appraisal.” In his classic essay, “Moral
Luck,” Thomas Nagel (1979, ch.3) repeatedly formulates the anti-luck
position as insisting that “moral assessments” of persons should not be
affected by factors outside their control. But as many commentators have
noted (e.g., Nelkin 2019), it’s not clear what assessments and appraisals are
or involve. On the dominant interpretation, they are merely evaluations of
the actor’s character—judgments about whether or to what extent the actor
is a “bad person” (Thomson 1989, 210 & n.3), or possesses or lacks “moral
worth.” (Greco 1995, 83). Construed that way, it is generally accepted that
moral assessments are insensitive to outcome luck: at least as far as these
paired episodes reveal, H and M are equally bad people and have equally
degraded moral worth. Be that as it may, if these assessments are
themselves morally inert—if they possess no further moral force—they do
not serve a normative function and are not my concern here. Contrariwise,
if different moral assessments of an agent do automatically trigger different
moral consequences, then the task is to focus on those moral consequences,
not on the assessments.
Second, the conditions that trigger the three potential changes might
differ. Many people are apt to conclude that the conditions that trigger
residual duties are less stringent than those that trigger liability, which are
in turn less stringent than those that make a harsh response favored.11
Third, all three types of changes implicate what are fairly conceived of
as kinds of “moral responsibility.” Inquiries into whether A shoulders a
residual duty, or is liable to blaming treatments, or should face unwelcome
consequences, on account of A’s φing, could all be couched in terms of
whether A was, in the relevant sense, “responsible” for φing. Still, if our
actions can produce these significant changes to our normative profiles, and
if the conditions under which the changes occur are at all regular (as they
should be), then it is reasonable to expect the normative community to have
formulated more particularized responsibility vocabulary that fits and
marks the conditions and relationships at least tolerably well. Those
expectations could be disappointed, but that would be surprising as well as
unhappy.

11 Rosen (2015, 66) seems to agree with the first contrast; having overlooked the
difference between liability and favoring functions, he cannot express a view about the
second.
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2. Desert as Favorer
It is a commonplace that desert is among the most mysterious and
undertheorized of our normative concepts. Analysis of desert claims
frequently starts with Joel Feinberg’s (1970, ch.4) tripartite framework
according to which an agent deserves some treatment or state of affairs (the
“desert object”) on account of some quality or action of the agent (the
“desert base”). Feinberg’s analysis is justifiably recognized as a significant
advance. But it was advanced (as “Justice and Personal Desert”) in 1963.
Our shared understanding of general features of desert claims has not
significantly advanced in the half-century since. Victor Tadros (2017, 394)
fairly captured the state of our understanding of desert when wryly
observing, in a review of Shelly Kagan’s 2012 book The Geometry of Desert,
that work on the topic is “so underdeveloped” that “the mere 24 footnotes
and 7 references” in Kagan’s 656-page tome “does not imply a failure to
acknowledge the achievements of others writing in the field.”
Some contributions to a smallish literature investigate features of
particular desert relationships. Philosophers of criminal law debate just
what it is (if anything) that wrongdoers deserve (to suffer, to be punished,
to be censured, etc.), 12 and what conditions in addition to, or in lieu of,
wrongdoing (e.g., culpability, harm) must obtain for that desert object to be
deserved. Philosophers interested in distributive justice explore the bases
for deserved economic resources. But the question that concerns us here is
about desert in general. It is a matter of desert’s “normative force” or
“normative significance.”
Suppose the following claims are true: A deserves a medal; B deserves
to win the race; C deserves the job; D deserves to be blamed; E deserves to
be happy; F deserves to be miserable; G deserves to be punished; H deserves
the nomination. The question about desert’s normative force asks what are
the deontic or axiological entailments of the fact that an agent deserves some
treatment or state of affairs, regardless of what that desert object, φ,
happens to be.
Philosophers have offered, or assumed, two basic answers to this
question. (e.g., Olsaretti 2003, 8; McKenna 2013, 135.) The first and older
answer, chiefly associated with deontology, ties desert closely to duty and
to justice: what it is for A to deserve φ on account of x is for justice to require
12 Differences between “to suffer” and “to be punished” as retributivist desert objects
are examined in Berman (2011).
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that φ obtain for A, and for some class of agents to harbor a duty or
obligation to bring φ about. The second answer, championed by
consequentialists (e.g., Kagan 2012; Hurka 2001; Feldman 1997), holds that
desert is a matter of value: what it is for A to deserve φ is for it to be
impersonally, non-instrumentally good or valuable that φ be actualized. As
one commentator (Kershnar 2010, xi) puts the latter view: “Desert is a
relation that is an aspect of the good. Specifically, desert is a function that
relates well-being, intrinsic value, and a ground. . . . Desert therefore looks
at the explanation of what makes the world a better place.” Additional
views combine these elements.13 What all the standard views of normative
force have in common is a conception of desert as serving a favoring role,
“either [as] as a matter of right or [as] a matter of (moral or nonmoral)
value.” (Sher 1987, xi) It is testament to this truth that it was a struggle to
introduce and explain the notion of favoring in section 1 without deploying
the language of desert.
The fundamental debate in punishment theory between retributivist
and consequentialist justifications for punishment reinforces that desert is a
favoring concept.
Despite many intramural disagreements within
retributivism, common ground is that it justifies punishment “in terms of”
the offender’s desert. (Berman 2016, 36-37). Here, the offender’s (supposed)
desert plainly serves other than a liability function. It serves a favoring
function. Retributivism is vigorously contested. Many philosophers think
it barbaric. Why? Chiefly because the notion of desert it deploys is a
favoring notion: A’s φing grounds an alteration in the impersonal
noninstrumental value of A’s suffering (or being punished, or what-haveyou), or grounds noninstrumental reasons for us to inflict punishment, or
visit suffering, upon A.

For example, I have proposed that valid desert claims affect non-instrumental value
and also confer weighty reasons or obligations, albeit conditionally. On my view (Berman
2013, 92), “That A deserves O on account of B means (a) given B, that A experience O (or that
O obtain for A) is better than that A not experience O (or that O not obtain for A); and (b) if
there is any agent or institution, X, with responsibility over the relevant domain, then X has
a duty of justice to cause O to obtain for A.”
Fittingness conceptions of desert, according to which what it is for A to deserve φ (on
account of x) is for it to be “fitting,” “apt,” or “appropriate” that A get φ, are not to the
contrary. Fittingness conceptions, it seems to me, merely push back the question of desert’s
normative force one step, pressing us now to inquire into the normative force or significance
of the fact that it would be fitting or apt that A get φ. And the usual answers to that question
associate duties of justice with duties to extend treatments that are fitting (because deserved),
hence plainly treat desert as favoring. As Geoffrey Cupit (1996, 35) remarks: “To accept
justice as fittingness is to accept that to treat people justly requires no more than that they be
treated in accordance with their deserts.”
13
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So we have a first-pass answer to the analytic question, with respect to
desert:
The analytic answer (desert): What it is for an agent, A, to deserve a
consequence or treatment, x, for an act, φ, is for it to be the case, in
virtue of A’s φing, that it is impersonally finally good for A to get
x, or that some agent, B, has (weighty, special) reason to cause A to
get x.

3. Blameworthiness as Liability
If desert captures the favoring notion of responsibility, it is natural to
suppose that blameworthiness captures the liability notion. If for A to have
negative desert for φing is for it to be the case that some negative or harsh
treatment of A that would otherwise be disfavored or forbidden is now
favored, then, very possibly, for A to be blameworthy for φing is for it to be
the case that A is now liable to some negative or harsh treatment to which A
would otherwise be immune. (This is not to say that the treatment at issue
is rendered permissible all things considered; it’s to say that a certain type of
especially salient and forceful barrier to the treatment is erased, canceled,
forfeited, or overridden.) Blameworthiness is a more modest upshot than
desert, which is what debates over the justifiability of punishment would
suggest: anti-retributivists will more readily accept that wrongdoing
grounds blameworthiness—it better, else responsibility-based side
constraints on instrumentalist goals would be in jeopardy—than that it
grounds desert.
My proposal, then, is that to be blameworthy is to be liable to some
otherwise proscribed “negative or harsh treatment.” It is meant to capture
a common and intuitive view, but faces resistance from two (not
incompatible) directions. It may be objected: first, that to be blameworthy
is to be liable to blame (and not to some more vaguely or capaciously
described forms of “harsh treatment”); and second, that to be blameworthy
is to deserve blame or harsh treatment (and not merely to be “liable” to it).
Let’s start with the first complaint, that my characterization of the
responses to which the blameworthy agent is made liable is unnecessarily
vague or objectionably general. The view I have in mind maintains that
what being blameworthy renders one liable to is to being blamed. And, if so,
we must carefully investigate what blame or blaming is to understand just
what it is to be blameworthy. (See Graham 2014, 388-89) I think this
doubtful even as a semantic matter. Were blameworthiness to have a
narrower scope than I claim for it, one that licenses only those responses
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that count as blame “in the strict sense,” then we should expect to have
concept-words for related but distinct moral concepts: “castigationworthy,” “punishment-worthy,” and so on. That (by and large) we don’t is
evidence for the proposition that “blame” in “blameworthy” operates as a
stand-in for a range of related practices. And this is just what ordinary lay
discourse suggests: speakers claim that they or others are “blameless” or
“not blameworthy” in speech acts intended to preserve the relevant actor’s
immunity from a wide variety of (actual or putative) “blaming practices”—
not only criminal punishment, but also vicarious liability in tort, military
retaliation, a diminution of regard in the community, consumer boycotts,
social stigma, rupture of friendships, and so on.14 In short, I think that we
can fairly bypass the need to excavate “the essence of blame” (Coates and
Tognazzini 2013, 8), by treating “blame” in “blameworthy” as shorthand for
a variety of practices that share a family resemblance in involving directed
criticism, censure, castigation, distancing, retaliation, infliction of costs or
hardship, punishment, and the like.15
Now take the second basis for resisting my proposed answer to the
analytic question as applied to blameworthiness: the common notion that
“to be blameworthy is to deserve blame.” Of course, people use all these
terms in diverse ways, and not everybody who says this intends to endorse
a favoring conception of the word “deserve.” No doubt some instances of
the utterance are meant to reflect the liability conception of
For a sampling of such varied claims, see Graeme Burton, “Morrisons tells court it’s
‘entirely blameless’ for 2014 payroll data leak: Firm claims it should not be held vicariously
liable,” The Inquirer, Nov. 7, 2019; “Student killed in London knife attack ‘entirely
blameless,’” The Guardian, Dec. 8, 2019; Omar Barghouti, “Boycott, Academic Freedom,, and
the Moral Responsibility to Uphold Human Rights,” 4 AAUP Journal of Academic Freedom 6
(2013); “A Mom’s Perspective: Having a Child With an Eating Disorder,” https://mirrormirror.org/getting-help/a-moms-perspective; Rick Smith, “Save Iowa’s 6,000 DACA
Children,” Iowa Starting Line, Sept. 4, 2017, https://iowastartingline.com/2017/09/04/saveiowas-6000-daca-children/; “John and Munger suspended, Merwe withdraws appeal, no
action on Tan,” The New Paper, Oct. 27, 2020.
15 Michael Zimmerman encourages this approach when observing that, “as Strawson
himself notes, among the responses that are typically taken to be fitting to the quality of will
manifested in someone’s behavior are responses that are not, or at least not merely, a matter
of adopting some attitude but rather of engaging in certain more robust practices, such as
the practices of reward and punishment.” (2015, 49). But he veers in a different direction
when flirting with the possibility that “[i]f there are indefinitely many possible reactions,
there may be indefinitely many kinds of responsibility.” (2015, 60). Zimmerman’s evident
discomfort with that conclusion might suggest that kinds of retroactive moral responsibility
are better individuated according to the broad kinds of changes to the moral profile
distinguished in section 1 (activation of duties of repair, liability to responses, and favoring),
rather than according to kinds of reactions to which one is liable. That approach does seem
too granular for our shared lexical concepts.
14

11

blameworthiness, only with a different vocabulary.16 But many aren’t. It
seems plain that some authors who assert that to be blameworthy is to
“deserve” blame thereby intend to assign blameworthiness a favoring
function (perhaps in addition to a liability one).17 If desert serves a favoring
function, and if part of what it is to be blameworthy is to deserve some
response, then blameworthiness itself must be a favorer and not a bare
matter of liability. Is it the case that for an agent to be blameworthy is for
them to deserve harsh or unwelcome responses in the sense that some such
responses directed to that agent are rendered not only permissible, but
favored as well?
Again, I do not think so. And, again, I suspect that the contrary view
depends overmuch on instincts about the semantics that do not withstand
scrutiny. The starting assumption, Rosen says, is that an account of
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness “should respect word structure.”
(2015, 66) “For X to be morally praise- or blameworthy for A is for X to be
worthy of—or to merit—a certain type of response in light of A.” And
because “merit” is a near-synonym for “deserve,”18 the conclusion is hard
to resist that to be blameworthy is to deserve blame.19
16 Some philosophers who say that for an agent to be blameworthy is for the agent to
deserve blame, gloss what it is for A to “deserve blame” as it’s being the case that A’s being
blamed is “warranted” (e.g., Arpaly 2003, 70-71). It is not always clear, though, whether such
theorists treat an action’s being warranted as a permissibility notion or a favoring one. As
with “fitting” and “appropriate,” (see note 12, above), “warranted” can be a waffle when not
clearly defined or explicated in terms of such more familiar normative notions as “good,”
“reason,” “duty,” and “ought.” This complaint has more force, however, insofar as our
interest lies in first-order ethics (my concern in this paper) rather than in moral psychology.
17 I think this is true of Michael McKenna, for example, and in an illuminating way.
Starting from a stated desire to accommodate, rather than to resist, “the familiar thought that
blame is deserved by one who is blameworthy,” (2013, 119) he ends up defending this striking
principle of “directed blame”: “Because it is a noninstrumental good that one who is
blameworthy is harmed by the communicative practices constitutive of directed blaming, it
is permissible to harm her by directly blaming her.” (McKenna 2013, 136). I say the principle
is striking because it is not generally true that a conclusion that some given conduct is
permissible depends on the premise that it’s valuable. So McKenna does not obviously need
his controversial claim about noninstrumental positive value (that it is good to harm
blameworthy agents by blaming them) to support his less controversial conclusion about
permissibility. Possibly, then, McKenna has made his job harder than it need have been. If
he has, that might be a consequence of his having associated the liability function that
blameworthiness serves too closely to the favoring function that desert serves.
18 See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1414 (offering one definition of
“merit”: to be or become deserving of good or ill).
19 Rosen does not himself take this last step, even though he does conclude—albeit
tentatively and while granting its “weirdness” (Rosen 2015, 86)—that an agent is
blameworthy if they deserve punishment, in the favoring sense. He reaches this conclusion
on the basis of his surmise that one of the belief-like thoughts implicit in resentment is that
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But resist it we should. We can accept the premise that an analysis of
blameworthiness should (presumptively) respect word structure without
accepting the conclusion that to be blameworthy is to “merit” or “deserve”
blame, in the favoring sense. It is true that the suffix -worthy is sometimes
defined as “deserving of.” But it can also mean “suitable or safe for.” That
a vessel is seaworthy does not entail that it deserves to be put to sea in the
sense that there is any intrinsic value in its being put to sea or that anyone
has reason, simply in virtue of the vessel’s seaworthiness, to put it to sea.
That a series is bingeworthy is not a reason to watch if you don’t watch tv,
or lack a taste for shows in that genre. That one is trustworthy does not
even entail that one deserves to be trusted; it merely signifies dependability,
or that trusting would not be misguided. That an actor is trustworthy
means only that if you have need for somebody to repose trust in (to give
disinterested advice, to watch over your stuff), you wouldn’t be making a
mistake to repose it in them.20
Accordingly, for A to be blameworthy can mean only that at least some
among a variety of ways of treating A that belong to the constellation of
“blaming” behaviors—modes of treatment that would otherwise be
unsuitable or inappropriate—are rendered suitable or apt. On this
definition, it would not follow that there is any agent, B, of whom it is true,
simply in virtue of the fact that A is blameworthy, that B has even a pro
tanto reason to blame A, just as it is not the case that there is any agent, B,
of whom it is true, simply in virtue of the fact that a craft is seaworthy, that
B has a reason to put the craft to sea. In both cases, whether B should engage
in the activity at issue (blaming A, putting the craft to sea) will depend upon
the presence of reasons that are not grounded in the fact of A’s
blameworthiness or seaworthiness, as the case may be.21
To be clear, my claim is not that the semantics require the interpretation
I offer, but only that they don’t preclude it if other theoretical criteria
the object of one’s resentment should “suffer in recognizing what she has done.” (Rosen 2015,
82). I find what Rosen says about resentment persuasive. What remains unclear to me is, if
agents can deserve “pain-in-recognition,” and if their deserving such pain is partly
constitutive of their being blameworthy, what considerations should attract us, or do attract
Rosen, to a Strawsonian rather than metaphysical account of blameworthiness in the first
place.
20 Some readers have had a different intuition about this. Relying on the thought that it
is insulting not to trust somebody who is trustworthy, they conclude that trustworthiness is
a favoring concept; that to be trustworthy is to deserve to be trusted. I think, rather, that the
insult lies in withholding trust from a trustworthy agent in circumstances in which you have
independent reason to repose trust in them if you deemed them trustworthy.
21 This is not to prejudge whether B’s reasons to engage in blaming activity could be
grounded, in whole or part, in the facts that ground the fact of A’s blameworthiness.
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recommend it. And other theoretical criteria do recommend it, including
the hope and expectation that our existing responsibility concepts and
associated nomenclature will fit tolerably well the normative functions that
our responsibility concepts must serve. Therefore, I propose to pair our
earlier analytic answer with respect to desert with the following analysis of
blameworthiness:
The analytic answer (blameworthiness): What it is for an agent, A, to
be blameworthy for an act, φ, is for it to be the case that A is
rendered liable to negative or harsh treatment—“blaming
practices”—to which A would otherwise be immune.
Assuming now that desert is a favoring concept and blameworthiness is a
liability concept, resolution of the moral outcome luck puzzle turns upon
the answers to Rosen’s grounding question as applied to each.
The grounding question (regarding outcomes and desert): Are the
fortuitously realized or unrealized results of an agent’s
wrongdoing among the determinants of the severity of the
treatment or response that is favored for the agent (i.e., that
possesses final value, or that somebody else ought to bring about)
in virtue of their wrongdoing?
The grounding question (regarding outcomes and blameworthiness): Are
the fortuitously realized or unrealized results of an agent’s
wrongdoing among the determinants of the blaming practices to
which the agent is liable in virtue of their wrongdoing?
The next two sections tackle these questions in order.

4. Negative Desert and Luck
What are the determinants of the character and severity of the punitive
response that is favored (bears positive value, or ought to be inflicted) in
virtue of an agent’s wrongdoing? This is the grounding question, as applied
to negative desert. We can’t answer it straightaway. The explanatory
question (or a somewhat more expansive variant) must be addressed first.
Whether or not H deserves more punishment (or other type of blame)
than M does, the inquiry presupposes that both H and M deserve some
punishment (or blame). Before we can intelligibly assess whether H
deserves more, we need some grasp of why they both deserve something
bad or disagreeable in the first place. Why does the fact that they tried to
kill another human being without justification render it good that they
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should suffer (or face deprivations, or shoulder burdens, etc.), or provide
non-instrumental reason for others to inflict suffering or impose
deprivations or burdens upon them? This is a notoriously hard question.
Until we have a good handle on what makes negative desert plausible or
defensible, or what its “moral underpinnings” are (Sher 1987, x), any
attempt to identify the full determinants of the negative desert object
(roughly, the deserved punishment) is flying blind.
Unfortunately, we lack a shared account of what makes desert sensible
or warranting our allegiance. Worse, we lack even a well-developed menu
of options to choose from. This is true even of positive desert objects, such
as rewards. It is true in spades of negative desert objects, especially given
determinist-inspired objections. How can the imposition of disagreeable
consequences on wrongdoers be non-instrumentally good or right if the
wrongdoers lacked freedom to do otherwise?22 Many people who do accept
negative desert view it as a moral primitive, accessible to moral intuition or
the product of fundamental moral commitments or convictions. I can’t rule
that out, but it’s plainly “a theory of last resort.” (Rosen 2015, 71; cf. Moore
1997, 223). For one thing, if desert lies at unexplainable moral bedrock then
it’s hard to see how we could resolve the grounding question except by
consulting the same moral intuitions that reveal the truth about desert itself.
Reasoned argument would seem fruitless.
I cannot proceed far in developing and defending a full account of
desert in this article. Instead, I’ll sketch the rudiments of an answer to the
explanatory question (posed of negative desert as a moral institution) that I
find most promising, what I’ll call the “agency-maintenance” account of
negative desert. I’ll then hazard some thoughts about what that answer,
skeletal though it is, implies for the grounding question.
4.1. The point of desert
The agency-maintenance account I favor explains desert as playing a
critical constitutive role in the formation and maintenance of selfhood. It
draws upon a subtle and incisive account pressed by George Sher (1987, ch.
9). I see it as consisting of three core elements.23
Derk Pereboom (2015, 281) seems to have a favoring conception of desert firmly in
mind when observing, rightly in my judgment, that, of all forms or senses of moral
responsibility, desert “is the sense most clearly threatened by” causal determinism.
23 Although influenced by Sher’s account, mine departs from his principally in
emphasizing the importance of free will, a (supposed) attribute of the self that is (curiously)
absent from Sher’s analysis. It seems to me both that free will is a central aspect of the
conception of the self at the heart of our moral system, and that that aspect is essential to
make sense of, and to vindicate, “negative” or “retributive” desert. By marginalizing or
22
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First, the moral system presupposes a certain conception of the moral
self, one that, among other qualities, possesses free will, and continues over
time. Whether, or in what respects, these presuppositions are true or false,
the system’s intelligibility and effective functioning depend upon their
preservation. Second, desert’s function, and thus its justification, is to assist
in the construction, nourishing, and shaping of the sense of self upon which
our moral system depends. The value of desert is thus both extrinsic and
final. Third, desert carries out this function by tethering present and future
selves to each other via the choices of the present self. It gives future selves
strong stakes in the moral character of the willings of the present self by
directing that consequences should obtain for those future selves. And by
insisting that the obtaining of those results is just—indeed, that justice
enjoins us to bring them about—desert proclaims agential freedom: Given
the widely held premise that if people lack free will then they cannot
possess negative desert, morality’s embrace of negative desert affirms free
will by modus tollens.
In sum, desert’s value is grounded (at least in part) in the way it gives
agents a stake in the exercises of their agency, thereby both helping to make
agency function effectively in the construction of selfhood and
strengthening dispositions to abide by morality’s dictates. This is not a
defense of desert from a perspective external to our system of moral
reasoning and practice. It is the seeds of an account of the critical function
that desert serves within that system.
4.2. Agency-maintenance and results
Assuming that something along the foregoing lines is correct—that
desert is intelligible and attractive largely because of the role it plays in
securing and strengthening the sense of selfhood that morality presupposes
and depends upon—what are the implications for the grounding question?
This too is disputable.
If an account that melds selfhood, agency, and desert is broadly on
target, then the ground of negative desert would encompass those aspects
of what a person has done that are fairly attributed to their agency by
individual psychology and shared cultural practices that are defensible on
reflection. Accordingly, if we could maintain a substantial and coherent
sense of ourselves stripped down to that which we control, we might be
ignoring free will, Sher is driven (ch.5) to embrace Herbert Morris’s (1968) “fair play”
justification for retributive punishment, a celebrated analysis that has attracted fewer
adherents over time. For a review of some criticisms, albeit in a rare recent contribution that
leans supportive, see Westen (2016).
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able to reap the benefits that the institution of desert makes possible without
including factors that lie beyond our control in our desert base. We might
be able to get by with a picture of the self constituted solely (or nearly so)
by its willings alone.
But the antecedent of that last conditional is highly doubtful. It’s not
only, as Wolf (2001, 13) emphasizes, that virtuous agents count (many of) the
results of their willings on their moral ledgers, as part of who they are and
what they’ve done.
More probably, most psychologically healthy
individuals, virtuous or not, do so too. As Nagel observed (1979, 36-37),
“the self which acts and is the object of moral judgment is threatened with
dissolution by the absorption of its acts and impulses into the class of
events. . . . [S]omething in the idea of agency is incompatible with actions
being events or people being things.” This being so, as I believe it to be, then
if desert links and integrates temporal slices of a self by putting later selves
“on the hook” for earlier selves’ actions, the “actions” that matter must be
broader than bare willings, or willings plus bodily movements, and extend
to at least some of our willed movement’s causal effects in the world.
Agreeing that “at least one connection between free acts and their
consequences is internal to the notion of free agency itself,” Sher (1987, 3940) argues that “[i]f someone did not have to live with the predictable
consequences of his choices—if he were able to go through the motions of
deciding what to do, but was invariably shielded from his action’s easily
foreseeable results—then he would have only a semblance of freedom.”
That could be so, though I would put matters just a little differently: if an
agent were shielded from their action’s foreseeable and foreseen results,
they would have only a semblance of selfhood. Desert helps preserve more
robust selfhood by embracing results of our willings among the
determinants of the treatments we deserve.
But only some of the results, not all of them, and it is a virtue of the
agency-maintenance account that it holds promise of explaining why and
which. Because this account of desert’s moral underpinnings depends on
the function it serves for members of a moral community, it turns on how
we understand ourselves and our actions, and not (only) on timeless truths
about, say, the nature of agency. It follows that whether results count
among the desert base of deserved punishment will be and must remain
significantly sensitive to folk wisdom.
The account thus makes sense of the fact that common law doctrines of
causal responsibility are largely social, not metaphysical. Examples include
the role of foreseeability and non-aberrant causal pathways in proximate
causation, and the understanding that intentional intervening action by
third parties “breaks the causal chain” even when foreseeable. The account
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also allows for the possibility that whether results count in the negative
desert base can vary depending on the wrongdoer’s mental state (intention,
foresight, recklessness, or negligence) with respect to the bad results that do
or do not materialize, for the simple (if not sole) reason that these diverse
mental states constitute or correspond to differences in the extent to which
the agent has associated their self with the results, as by desiring them.
Contrast H and M, the shooters who intend the death of V, with two other
actors, HN and MN, who act negligently with respect to VN’s death. (The
standard hypothetical involves careless driving: HN and MN drive
identically in respect of the facts that constitute negligence, but HN has the
bad luck to hit and kill a pedestrian while MN has the good luck not to.) The
fact that we naturally describe H themself, and not only H’s actions, by
terms (“killer,” “murderer”) that make necessary reference to the results of
that action, and that such agential descriptions are definitionally
inapplicable to M, plausibly goes some distance toward explaining why the
happenstance whether V was hit and killed counts among the determinants
of H’s and M’s negative desert. In contrast, we probably resist describing
HN in terms (e.g., “killer,” “manslaughterer”) that refer to the results of HN’s
actions, choosing instead to describe both HN and MN as negligent drivers,
while also noting that HN is a negligent driver who caused somebody’s
death. On the agency-maintenance account, these facts about ordinary
thought and talk have both evidential and constitutive significance in
determining the contours of outcome luck for negative desert.
***
This section’s discussion is admittedly tentative.
It is reasonably
contestable whether (or which) results are determinants even assuming that
the Sher-inspired selfhood-securing account of desert at which I gesture is
correct. And the merits of that account are equally contestable. For both
these reasons, I do not offer a confident bottom-line judgment about
whether results count among the determinants of an agent’s desert object.
But it cannot be this section’s task to develop and defend a complete
vindicating explanation for desert as a moral concept with normative force.
Its more limited ambition is to offer a promising sketch of such an
explanation and thereby to show how resolving whether outcomes of an
agent’s action bear on what they deserve depends, first, on settling on an
answer to the explanatory question as applied to negative desert as a
functional concept within our moral system.
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5. Blameworthiness and Luck
What conditions must obtain to render an actor morally liable to be
subjected to blaming practices? Here’s a common idea (e.g., Brink and
Nelkin, 289). First, the actor must be a “moral agent,” someone who is, in
Gary Watson’s (1996) sense, morally “accountable.” Second, even an
accountable agent is not liable to blame unless they were “at fault.” Now,
precisely what fault consists in is controversial—failure to satisfy a fair
standard of conduct fairly enforced, conscious violation of a moral norm,
and so forth. But that an agent isn’t blameworthy—isn’t morally liable to
being blamed—unless at fault in one or another sense is common ground.
Also common to all the varied conceptions of the fault that grounds
blameworthiness is that it involves matters “internal” to the agent. Subject
to a few possible clarifications or qualifications,24 it turns on features of the
agent’s will or the way that they deliberated or failed to deliberate. Because
blameworthiness is a scalar not binary concept, it might seem to follow that
the extent of one’s blameworthiness must be entirely determined by the
extent of one’s fault. It might seem to follow, in other words, that the
character and severity of the blaming practices to which one is liable when
blameworthy are entirely determined by the internal factors that constitute
fault, whatever they may be. And if this is so, then the results of an agent’s
conduct are categorically irrelevant to their blameworthiness, which is to
say that blameworthiness must be entirely insensitive to luck in the way
things turn out. In our motivating hypothetical, H and M would be equally
blameworthy. (And same too for HN and MN.) Wolf’s “rationalist position”
(2001, 6-7) captures this familiar line of argument.
The conclusion is too quick, however, for the fact (if true) that fault is
the sole necessary condition for an agent to be blameworthy does not entail
that it is the sole determinant of the scope or extent of their
blameworthiness. Although this point might be obvious enough once
asserted, its force becomes more apparent when we note an ambiguity built
into the notion of degrees of blameworthiness, and thus disambiguate two
respects in which blameworthiness is scalar. 25 Take two agents both of
I am especially thinking that external standards of proper behavior may bear
constitutively on the fault that constitutes blameworthiness in cases of (inadvertent)
negligence, if blameworthiness can consist in negligence, itself a much-debated matter. See
Berman (forthcoming 2022a).
25 The distinction is hinted at in Jensen (1993) and keenly developed in Enoch and
Marmor (2007, 412-17). My analysis on this point is in broad accord with theirs, although I
24
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whom are blameworthy for some (faulty) conduct. One could be more or
less blameworthy than the other in terms either of (a) the magnitude or
severity of blame to which they are liable, or (b) the extent of their liability
to blame.
So there are two possible grounding questions about
blameworthiness, not one: (a) what determines how much blame the actor
is liable to? And (b) what determines how much the actor is liable to blame?
These are different questions that could provoke different answers.
The remainder of this section explicates and defends these two
dimensions of the scalarity of blameworthiness, draws out their
straightforward implications for moral outcome luck, and addresses one
concern the picture might provoke. What this section does not do is spend
any time pondering what need we have for a concept (blameworthiness)
that serves a liability function—an omission that would be unworthy of note
but for Section 4’s insistence that we do need to investigate the normative
grounding or justification for a concept (desert) that serves a favoring
function. The explanation for this asymmetry is simple. As Section 4
emphasizes, the intelligibility or justifiability of negative desert is
nonobvious and reasonably contested. In contrast, the intelligibility and
justifiability of blameworthiness is obvious and noncontroversial. Given
what we know about human psychology and social dynamics, blaming
practices that are disagreeable to the blaming patient cannot be wholly, or
even substantially, eliminated. Accordingly, a morality sensitive to the
human condition must recognize the permissibility of at least some such
practices, in which case we have plain need for a moral operator that
performs a liability function.
5.1. Two respects in which blameworthiness is scalar
In our actual penal practices and everyday lives, we recognize very
many factors as bearing on the extent, duration, and severity of appropriate
or permissible blaming practices. Collectively, we consider: the gravity of
the wrong done or the importance of the norm violated; the extent of the
agent’s departure from the standard of conduct in cases where departures
can be measured in degrees; whether the agent knew their conduct was
wrong; whether the agent had done it before; the agent’s background and
do not share their contention (413) that “[q]uestions about blameworthiness are about the
truth or falsehood of attributions of blame.” It seems to me that what we attribute to an
agent when engaging in “blame-related reactions” is not “blame” but “blameworthiness,”
yet we cannot substitute the latter for the former on pain of circularity. Furthermore, Enoch
and Marmor overlook what I am claiming is a critical distinction between desert and
blameworthiness and therefore do not consider the possibility that the denial of free will
threatens the former but not the latter (435).

20

upbringing and the breadth of their opportunities to avoid wrongdoing; the
treatment accorded other, similarly situated faulty actors; the “standing” of
those who would impose blame; the likelihood that a severe response
would have a positive effect on future behavior by this agent or by similarly
situated others; and other factors too. Unless our accepted practices are in
truly bad order (admittedly possible), it must be that the severity of blame
to which we make ourselves liable by our fault is not fully determined by
the internal factors that determine fault, thereby licensing blame.
What are the alternatives? Conceivably, the relevant factors determine
permissible blame via a complex formula or function. But the history of
efforts to distill such a function does not encourage optimism. Much more
plausible is that an agent’s faulty behavior renders them liable to
“reasonable” blaming practices, where reasonableness, here as elsewhere,
is a function of a plurality of factors and resists significant precisification.
Even if so, suppose now that the blameworthy actor, albeit a moral
agent and not somebody exempt from the reactive attitudes, suffers from
significant cognitive or volitional impairments. For example, the agent:
suffers from mental disease or disorder that interferes with normative
reasoning or behavioral regulation, is an adolescent, has a very low I.Q., acts
in a state of reason-clouding anger (provoked by adequate provocation),
intense fear, or extreme sleep deprivation, or is (involuntarily) intoxicated.
Most commentators believe that all or some of such factors mitigate the
agent’s blameworthiness; some are subjects of full or partial excuse in the
criminal law. But these factors do not operate—certainly not exclusively,
and I think not primarily—as considerations that bear on what blaming
practices would be all-things-considered reasonable, as by weighing toward
leniency. They operate by reducing the agent’s liability to blaming and
punitive responses. This is largely what is at stake when commentators
characterize persons who exhibit these defects or conditions as “less
responsible.”
Combining these two dimensions of variability produces this first
sketch of the fuller picture of blameworthiness: To be blameworthy is to be
liable to blame in virtue of one’s being at fault. The character and severity
of blame to which the faulty actor renders themself liable is determined by
what is reasonable given the agent’s conduct, the consequences of that
conduct, and the relevant circumstances, discounted by any diminution in
the agent’s liability to blame grounded, paradigmatically, in defects in the
agent’s settled or episodic rationality or systems of intrapersonal
integration or control. Many mechanical systems incorporate two devices
to adjust output (e.g., volume, heat, power): one that permits gross
adjustment, a second for fine-tuning. In roughly analogous fashion, the
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magnitude of hostility or disagreeability to which one is liable in virtue of
one’s faulty conduct is determined by all the factors that bear on the
reasonableness of a response, discounted by the degree of the actor’s
liability to such responses.
A vignette illustrates. Suppose that Ringleader, Schnook, and Juvenile
together commit Crime. It was Ringleader’s idea, of course. Schnook joined
as a most reluctant and regretful second fiddle, and only after long resisting
Ringleader’s wheedling and importuning. Juvenile signed on willingly,
even enthusiastically, but is an adolescent. When arrested, Schnook and
Juvenile argue strenuously that they are “less blameworthy” than
Ringleader, and should be punished less severely—Schnook because he was
less “culpable,” in a broad sense bespeaking a less “vicious will,” and
Juvenile because he was less emotionally and psychologically mature. I
assume that readers can fill in details (concerning the age or maturity of the
protagonists, Ringleader and Schnook’s interactions and the influence the
one had over the other, the Crime itself, and so on) in ways that would make
Schnook’s and Juvenile’s arguments compelling. But while both claims are
couched in terms of the claimant’s lesser blameworthiness, I anticipate that
many readers will share the sense that these claims have distinctly different
texture. The account I’ve just sketched aims to reflect that difference:
Schnook maintains that they’re liable to less blame than is Ringleader;
Juvenile maintains that they’re less liable to blame than is Ringleader.
Is the proposed distinction between how much one is liable to blame
and how much blame one is liable to sterile? Does anything turn on the fact
that Juvenile’s claim is one of the latter and not (only) of the former? Would
it matter if you became persuaded that Schnook’s claim also concerned
liability? There are reasons to believe that it does matter. The gist of the
case for Juvenile is not only or chiefly that it’s unreasonable to disregard the
difference in their maturity, but that we are morally required to
accommodate it, that Juvenile has a valid claim to diminution or attenuation
of his liability to blaming treatments.
Plausibly, then, punishing
Ringleader, Schnook, and Juvenile equally would treat both Schnook and
Juvenile unreasonably hence unfairly, but would violate the moral rights
only of Juvenile.
Or, shifting attention away from state-inflicted
punishment and toward social practices, maybe Victim of Crime, or others
in the community, may be entitled, when calibrating their blaming
responses, to disregard differences between Ringleader and Schnook, but
not between Ringleader and Juvenile.
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5.2. The relevance of results
This two-part account of the ways in which blameworthiness comes in
degrees neatly explains our divergent intuitions about whether results of an
agent’s conduct affect their blameworthiness.
Question (a): Are the fortuitously realized or unrealized results of an
agent’s faulty or wrongful conduct among the determinants of the blaming
practices to which the agent is liable in virtue of their fault? Surely yes. If
being at fault makes one liable to “reasonable” blaming practices, then,
whatever the full set of considerations that bear on the propriety of a
blaming response might consist in, it’s hard to dispute that at least some
results of the faulty agent’s conduct—what the agent does and causes—
count within that set. 26 Experiencing resentment and indignation, and
engaging in practices that express those sentiments and allow for the
channeled discharge of retaliatory impulses, are all part of the human
condition. But it is pathological to harbor as much resentment, or to indulge
in equally severe chastisement or retaliation, regardless of whether
another’s faulty behavior caused you or those you care about any harm at
all. So if H and M are equally liable to reasonable blame, H is nonetheless
liable to more severe blame or retaliation, including blame that is more
severe in virtue of extending for greater duration, just because the amount
of reasonable outrage and hostility provoked by H’s killing of V is greater
than that provoked by M’s failed attempt to kill V. Furthermore, if results
are part of the desert base (the question left open in Section 4), and if
reasonable blaming practices include the infliction of whatever censure or
hard treatment may be deserved, then, again, the severity of blame to which
a faulty agent is liable is greater if the results of the faulty conduct are worse.

This contention is largely supported by findings from the moral cognition literature,
though I don’t place much weight on it. After all, given that I am arguing that the moralconceptual landscape harbors more distinctions than the relevant philosophical literature
has yet recognized, it’s almost inevitable that I’d find the empiricists’ survey instruments
insufficiently nuanced. For example, one sophisticated recent contribution that fairly
criticizes previous studies for invoking “a staggering variety in types of judgments,” asks
respondents “how blameworthy” contrasting agents are, how “permissible” their actions
were, and “how much punishment” each “deserves.” Kneer and Machery (2019, 333, 334);
see also Cushman (2008, 358). My analysis suggests that respondents highly attuned to
philosophically relevant distinctions might give different answers to the questions “how
much punishment does the agent deserve?” “how much punishment would be reasonable to
impose?” and “how much punishment would be permissible to impose?” To illustrate, a
sensible respondent might believe that the reasonable punishment for Schnook and Juvenile
is roughly the same but that the permissible punishment for Schnook is greater. And if such
a respondent is a negative desert skeptic, they might also believe that none of the actors
deserves any punishment at all.
26
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This is not to say that the reactive treatment that the agent deserves
constitutes the full measure of what is reasonable. Even assuming that
reasonable blaming responses are responses we have reason to undertake,
those reasons are not nearly limited to that of effectuating deserved
treatment for its own sake; they include deterrent, expressive, and
solidaristic reasons, among others.27
Moreover, because the agent subjected to blame could have avoided the
influence of outcome luck by not acting in a faulty manner to start, the fact
that the degree of blame to which they are liable is sensitive to some facts
beyond their control does not seem unfair: the agent has assumed that risk.
Invoking Ronald Dworkin’s (1981) distinction between “brute luck” and
“option luck,” Michael Otsuka (2009, 375) puts the point well: “A plausible
requirement of fairness would, at most, rule out unavoidable
blameworthiness. It would not also rule out cases of moral luck in which
one’s degree of blameworthiness is a function of factors beyond one’s
control but where one could have avoided being blameworthy
altogether.”28
Question (b): Are the fortuitously realized or unrealized results of an
agent’s wrongdoing among the determinants of the agent’s liability to
blaming practices? Plainly not. Although what determines an agent’s
responsibility in the accountability or liability-discounting sense is far from
settled, the standard accounts focus squarely on defects in agency, such as
deficits in reason-responsiveness or executive control. If it is stipulated that
the only difference between H and M concerns the downstream, external
consequences of their pulling of their respective gun triggers, then they are
equally “accountable,” equally liable to blame.
Moore (1997, 212) interprets Nagel thusly: “The problem of moral luck .
. . is how we can justify holding people more responsible for causing harm
than for merely intending [harm].” Distinguishing two scalar notions
baked into the concept of blameworthiness permits a clean solution. The
question should not be whether an agent who causes harm is “more
responsible” than one who, all else equal, tries to cause harm but fails.
Certainly, they are equally responsible in the sense, among others, of being
equally liable to blaming responses. The question should be whether we
can justify inflicting more severe blame on those who cause harm than on
those who don’t, despite their being equally liable to blaming treatment.
Certainly, we can. Although H and M are equally responsible, hence

27 Accord Enoch and Marmor (2007, 413). I am grateful to an anonymous referee for
encouraging this clarification.
28 The same insight underlies David Lewis’s (1989) proposed penal lottery.
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equally liable to reasonable blame, the amount and character of blame that
would be reasonable to subject each to is not the same.
5.3. A loose end: reasonable blame and principles of proportionality
The proposal that to be liable to blame in virtue of one’s fault is to make
oneself fairly liable to “reasonable” blaming practices whose character and
severity are determined by more than fault alone provokes a natural worry.
Suppose a case involving very little fault but immensely bad consequences.
If the public’s anger has been greatly aroused, and if the welfarist benefits
of deterring similar future acts are also great, then the imposition of severe
blame, including severe punishment, will turn out to be all-thingsconsidered reasonable at least sometimes.
Call this upshot “the
objectionable conclusion.” If my parsing of the concepts yields this
conclusion, that might seem a blot on the account.
To be sure, the objectionable conclusion is objectionable: assumption of
risk has its limits as well as its force. To guard against it, nearly all
philosophers of punishment agree that punishment is constrained by a
“principle of proportionality,” differing chiefly on that principle’s correct
content—for example, that punishment must not be disproportionate to the
offender’s “guilt,” (Mackie 1982, 4) or the “gravity of the offense” (von
Hirsch 1992, 55), or can be no greater than the minimum necessary to
preserve civil order (Deigh 2018, 239). One family of principles that have
attracted broad support maintains that punishment should not be
disproportionately severe relative to the agent’s “culpability” (alone, or in
combination with “wrong” or “harm”), where culpability is a measure of
the agent’s ill will, or their disregard of interests and values that demand
respect. (Culpability is a kind of fault, but only one kind of fault. There is
no faultless culpability, but plenty of nonculpable faultiness.) I am
sympathetic to a principle along these lines.
This is not the place to elaborate or defend a principle with any
particular content; I take a stab at it in Berman (2022b). The important point
for now is only that debates over principles of penal proportionality, or over
other side constraints on the just infliction of state punishment, are not best
conceived as debates about the contours of our moral concepts. Rather, they
reflect substantive disagreements of political morality, first-order claims
about the ethics or justice of state action. It is no embarrassment to a
conceptual map, this or any other, that it does not exclude all morally
disagreeable practices and states of affairs on purely conceptual grounds,
and that we must call on substantive moral principles to perform that trick.
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Conclusion
This article investigates how, if at all, moral outcome luck affects or
determines an agent’s blameworthiness and negative desert. In addressing
that question, it identifies a premise that appears widely presupposed in the
moral luck debate: that the determinants of blameworthiness and desert are
the same. I call that premise the equivalence thesis, and argue that it is false.
In rejecting that premise, this article sheds light on the tantalizing possibility
that results, and thus luck that attends their realization or non-realization,
can matter to one concept but not the other. Nonetheless, the paper ends
up resisting this neat and clean resolution to the puzzle of outcome luck. It
maintains that results probably bear both on the magnitude or severity of
the blame to which the agent is liable when blameworthy and on the
magnitude or severity of the adverse treatment that the agent deserves,
though not on the extent of the agent’s liability to blaming practices.
Because those last conclusions are modestly more equivocal than reader
and author alike might wish, it bears emphasis that, while this article
addresses the purported equivalence of blameworthiness and desert as they
concern the relevance of outcomes, the equivalence thesis itself is not of
such limited import. That thesis concerns the more general question of
whether the determinants and measure of an agent’s blameworthiness for
an act are the same as the determinants and measure of an actor’s desert for
the same act. The negative answer I defend to that question has
implications for moral outcome luck, but not only for that. The truth or
falsity of the equivalence thesis is likely to matter anytime an agent’s desert
or blameworthiness bears on the permissibility of criminal punishment. A
clear distinction between the functions that desert and blameworthiness
serve, and a clear understanding of their respective determinants, might
shed light on debates: over the nature and bounds of responsibility-based
side constraints on the infliction of punishment; over the permissibility of
punishing people for negligence; over the proper scope of a defense of
moral ignorance; and over much else besides. Although this one paper does
not examine those other topics, it is worth keeping in mind that its initial
and most important claims—desert serves a favoring function,
blameworthiness serves a liability function, and the determinants of these
two concepts are non-identical—will bear implications for a very broad
range of topics within the philosophy of blame and punishment.
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